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TOWARDS A NEW LENS OF ANALYSIS:
THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
TO CHILD NEGLECT STATUTES

Gregory Engle*
I.INTRODUCTION
Every year, many children die of afflictions that are, at their core,
completely treatable. They are allowed to succumb to these diseases and
conditions—some as benign as a curable intestinal blockage1—solely
because their parents subscribe to a religion that forbids them from visiting
a doctor or seeking treatment at a hospital. Instead, they seek spiritual
treatment through prayer and ritual. This is arguably within the liberty
interests of adults, but when children are involved, the situation is much
more complicated.
Every state has enacted statutes to prevent child abuse. In Virginia, for
instance, “[a]ny parent, [or] guardian,... who by willful act or omission or
refusal to provide any necessary care for the child’s health causes or permits
serious injury to the life or health of such child shall be guilty of a Class 4
felony.”2 In addition to preventing active abuse, this statute is notable for
criminalizing inaction. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
federally mandated these statutes in 1974,3 along with a requirement that an
exemption for religious belief be included. Though the requirement for
exemption has since been lifted, many states still have them in force.4 It is
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, University of Notre Dame.
The author thanks Professor Kevin Walsh for his guidance in the preparation of this piece. Thanks also
go to his parents John and Shelley, and his fiancee, Jamie Grebowski, for their patience and support
throughout his legal education.
1. See SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, WHEN PRAYER FAILS: FAITH HEALING, CHILDREN, AND THE LAW 17778 (2008). The child, 13-year-old Sandra Kay Arnold, could have been saved by a simple surgery up to
twelve hours before her death. Id.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(A).
3. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 42 §§ 5101-5119c (2003)).
4. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Treatment Program, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2 (1983).
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largely these exemptions that allow for children to die without ever seeing a
doctor.
The exemptions are roundly criticized, and these criticisms are often
couched in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This clause prohibits the
government from awarding precedence, favor, and legal exemption to
certain religious groups.5 This criticism is a strong one, but has flaws. A
better way of looking at these exemptions is through the lens of the Equal
Protection Clause.6 Simply put, exemptions create one class of children
who are not awarded the same legal protections as another class, violating
their constitutional rights and endangering their lives.
In order to analyze the religious exemptions, this paper will begin with
their history. Part II looks at the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act of 1974 (CAPTA) the statute that precipitated their spread, as well as
the justifications that it was bolstered upon: Free Exercise of religion and
parental rights. The Equal Protection critique follows as Part III, followed
by Part IV that discusses the traditional critique, grounded in the
Establishment Clause. In Part V, the article will finish with an explanation
of why the Equal Protection critique is a much stronger criticism.

II. THE HISTORY OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXEMPTIONS
A. CAPTA and Its Aftermath
In 1974, Congress confronted the inconsistent standards of child abuse
and neglect statutes across the country by unifying them into one national
standard; this was accomplished through CAPTA.7 The Act did not contain
specific exemptions for religious purposes, but was rather left to the
judgment of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).8
Now known as the Department of Health and Human Services, the agency
“interpreted [the act] as requiring an exemption from child neglect liability
for parents who treated their children by faith healing. Thus, HEW required
the states to adopt religious exemptions before they could receive federal

5. U.S. CONST. amend I.
6. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
7. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, supra note 3.
8. J. T. Gathings, When Rights Clash: The Conflict Between a Parent’s Right to Free Exercise of
Religion Versus His Child’s Right to Life, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 591 (1989).
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funding for state child-protection programs.”9 The states followed suit
accordingly, enshrining in their various codes language such as the
following: “[A] minor child who in good faith is under treatment solely by
spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices
of a recognized church or religious denomination shall not for that reason
alone be considered [an abused or neglected child].”10
Since the 1974 regulation, the Department has changed its position
drastically. In 1983, new regulations were adopted, striking down the
exemption requirement: “nothing in the federal rule should be construed as
requiring or prohibiting a finding of neglect when a parent practicing his or
her religious beliefs does not, on that basis alone, provide medical treatment
for his or her child.”11 Four years later, a regulation was promulgated that
clarified even further:
Previous regulations for this program required that State statutes contain a
provision that, when parents or guardians provide spiritual or other forms of
remedial health care, they should not, for that reason alone, be considered
negligent parents. This requirement was deleted in the final rules published
January 26, 1983. [S]uch an eligibility requirement was not required by the
Act and thus should not be imposed by Federal regulation.12

It would seem as though this language is relatively straightforward and
would pave the way for repeal of these exemptions. Conventional wisdom

9. Id.; see Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45 Fed. Reg. 43,936, 43,937
(Dec. 19, 1974) (“a parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does not
provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason alone shall not be considered a negligent
parent or guardian . . . .”).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(C) (2001); see Rita Swan, On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children
of Rights to Medical Care: Can This Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73, 81
nn.47–48 (1998) (listing many other statutes).
11. Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance
Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child’s Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319, 332
(1991). See Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3)(ii)
(1983) (“[N]othing in this part should be construed as requiring or prohibiting a finding of negligent
treatment or maltreatment when a parent practicing his or her religious beliefs does not, for that reason
alone, provide medical treatment for a child . . . .”).
12. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 52 Fed. Reg. 3990, 3993 (Feb. 6,
1987) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 40).
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says, however, that once in place, laws are very hard to repeal.13 As such,
only a handful of states have amended their statutes, including Colorado,
Oklahoma, and South Dakota.14
B. Justifying Exemptions
1. Free Exercise
The primary motivation for these exemptions is grounded in the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. “Congress shall make no
law...prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”15 A compelling argument
and reasoning for this protection is rooted in the writings of the so-called
“Father of the Constitution,”16 James Madison. In his famous Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, Madison wrote:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience
of every man.... Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess
and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot
deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the
evidence which has convinced us.17

The question of free exercise and exemptions is relatively settled vis-àvis competent adults. Given “the fundamental premise that everyone has
the inherent right to control their own person,”18 it is readily accepted that
13. Some argue that the Christian Science Church, a strong faith-healing sect, has a near-unlimited
lobbying arm, which exerts significant pressure on the legislature and helps keep these protections in
place. See Kei Robert Hirasawa, Note, Are Parents Acting In the Best Interests of Their Children When
They Make Medical Decisions Based on Their Religious Beliefs?, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 318 n.31
(2006) (“[T]he Christian Science Church . . . maintain[s] a salaried lobbyist in every state and
besieg[es] legislators with letters, calls, and visits from church members.”); Scott St. Amand, Protecting
Neglect: The Constitutionality of Spiritual Healing Exemptions to Child Neglect Statutes, 12 RICH. J. L.
& PUB. INT. 139, 147 (2009) (observing “lobbying by the coordinate mass of Christian Scientists”);
Allison Ciullo, Note, Prosecution Without Persecution: The Inability of Courts to Recognize Christian
Science Spiritual Healing and a Shift Towards Legislative Action, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 170
(2007) (“[E]xemptions are often the result of extensive lobbying campaigns and debates by politically
active Christian Scientists.”).
14. COLO. REV. STAT. § 193-103(1) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852(C) (2002 & Supp. 2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-1.1 (Supp. 1990).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
16. See About The White House, Presidents: James Madison,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/jamesmadison (last visited December 4, 2009) (“[i]n later
years, . . . he was referred to as the ‘Father of the Constitution.’”).
17. David E. Steinberg, Children and Spiritual Healing: Having Faith in Free Exercise, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 179, 190 (2000) (citing 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religion Assessments, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)).
18. Julie E. Koehne, Comment, Witnesses on Trial: Judicial Intrusion Upon the Practices of Jehovah’s
Witness Parents, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 208 (1993) (citing In re Guardianship of Browning, 568
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“a competent individual has a constitutionally protected right to refuse
medical treatment regardless of his or her medical condition”19 – a right that
is not changed if religion is involved.
In the American spectrum of religions, some sects rely solely upon
prayer to heal medical needs. A major example is that of the Church of
Christ, Scientist, commonly known as the Christian Science church. The
church was founded in the late nineteenth century, and teaches that
“diseases and sickness are manifestations of the mind that can be overcome
only by praying and drawing closer to God.”20 Specific healing counselors
are appointed and trained in the church’s way, and are called upon to
provide assistance in medical emergencies.21 Believers argue that in order
to fully practice their religion, they must not be forced to take their children
to doctors.22
The Jehovah’s Witnesses are in a similar situation. Founded in 1876,23
the Witnesses do not have an outright ban on medical care or visits to
doctors and hospitals, but they do “generally refuse to take blood
transfusions even when these are judged by physicians to be absolutely
necessary for the preservation of life and health.”24 This refusal is “based
upon what they believe to be the Bible’s prohibition against ‘eating
blood.’”25 They remain committed to this belief despite any outsiders’
arguments.26 Again, followers argue that if they were required to take their
children to doctors or hospitals, and their conditions necessitated a blood
transfusion – an increasingly common procedure for any number of
afflictions – it would interfere with their ability to fully practice their
religion.27

So.2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990)).
19. Id.
20. Elizabeth Lingle, Treating Children by Faith: Colliding Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEGAL MED
301, 306.
21. See Comment, Commonwealth v. Twitchell: Who Owns the Child? 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 413, 423 (1991).
22. See Lingle, supra note 20, at 306.
23. Koehne, supra note 18, at 207.
24. John C. Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah’s Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAW. 212, 212
(1964).
25. Koehne, supra note 18, at 207 & n.14 (citing various biblical provisions relied upon by Witnesses).
26. See Ford, supra note 26, at 212 (“If it is objected that this was a dietary law, having nothing to do
with the medical use of blood, they reply that a transfusion is the equivalent of eating; it is intravenous
feeding.”).
27. See id. at 215.

380

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:227

In addition to these two major sects with religiously based aversion to
doctors, numerous fringe groups exist. One example is the Followers of
Christ Church, located in Oregon City, Oregon.28 This church has created a
small uproar in its community for over a decade.29 In 1998, the state’s
medical examiner alleged that “the faith-healing congregation’s avoidance
of doctors and hospitals may have cost the lives of 25 children, some under
excruciating circumstances.”30 In the decade since, there have been more
deaths, including 15-month-old Ava Worthington, who died in 2008 of
bacterial pneumonia and a blood infection.31 These conditions were
treatable, but her family merely prayed for her recovery, “never [seeking]
medical treatment or call[ing] 9-1-1, not even when [the child] stopped
breathing.”32 This led to the conviction of her father for second-degree
criminal mistreatment in the summer of 2009, with another family to face
trial in January 2010.33
Another church is the Unleavened Bread Ministries, based mostly on the
Internet.34 This church came under scrutiny for the death of 11-year-old
Madeline Kara Neumann, who died on Easter Sunday of 2008 of untreated
diabetes, a common and manageable condition.35 Her parents were
convicted of second-degree reckless homicide in August, 2009, and “were
ordered to spend 30 days in jail each year for the next six years and were
placed on 10 years’ probation.”36 These small churches, some with no more

28. Jonathan Turley, When a Child Dies, Faith is No Defense, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2009, at B1.
29. See id.
30. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 179–80 (quoting David Van Biema, Faith or Healing? Why the Law
Can’t Do a Thing About the Infant-Mortality Rate of an Oregon Sect, TIME, (Aug. 31, 1998) at 68).
31. Turley, supra note 28 at B1.
32. Steve Mayes, Jurors’ Empathy Led to ‘Epiphany’, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.) July 24, 2009.
33. See Rick Bella, Faith Healer Gets Jail Time, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), August 1, 2009.
34. Scott St. Amand, supra note 13, at 139–40. This church teaches:
We are not commanded in scripture to send people to the doctor but to meet their needs
through prayer and faith . . . . [W]e are not against doctors for those who have their faith
there and never condemn or restrict them in any way. But we know that the best one to
trust in for healing is Jesus Christ.
Press Release, David Ellis, Press Release from Unleavened Bread Ministries Regarding the Death of 11
Year-Old Madeline Kara Neumann (Mar. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.wsaw.com/news/misc/17059725.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
See generally
Unleavened Bread Ministries, http://www.unleavenedbreadministries.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2009).
35. Emma Graves Fitzsimmons, Wisconsin Couple Sentenced In Death of Their Sick Child, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2009, at A16.
36. Id.
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than two hundred members, do not have the same prominence or notoriety
as the larger sects, but nevertheless argue for their own religious freedoms
and for the protections mandated by the Constitution.37
2. Parental Rights
Notwithstanding any Free Exercise concerns that may necessitate a
religious exemption, many also rely upon secular “parental rights” to
support exemptions. Though not grounded in one specific statute or
religious tenet, courts have long established that parents have the right to
raise their children to meet their particular family’s habits and mores.
a. Education
The most common example of parental rights is in the field of education.
A 1925 case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, established the rights of parents to
send their children to a private school.38 An Oregon law was passed, the
Compulsory Education Act, “requir[ing] every parent... of a child between
eight and sixteen years to send him ‘to a public school...in the district where
the child resides.”39 The Society of Sisters operated a Roman Catholic
school that would necessarily be harmed by the enforcement of this act, and
so sued to enjoin its provisions.40 The Supreme Court found, in a
unanimous opinion, that “the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
under their control.”41 Offering a strong endorsement of parental rights, the
Court explained that “the child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”42 The statute
was thus ruled unconstitutional.
Many years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court again addressed the
question of parental rights with regard to education.43 The Old Order
Amish believe in a separatist and traditional way of life, eschewing most
interactions with modern society.44 As such, they elect to keep their
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Lingle, supra note 20, at 309.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 535.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
Id. at 210.
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children home from school once they have learned basic fundamentals –
typically after eighth grade.45 Wisconsin, however, had a statute mandating
school attendance until the age of sixteen, and three families were convicted
of violating this statute for keeping their children home.46
After acknowledging the precedent of Pierce, the Court took a “hybrid
rights” theory and held that “when the interests of parenthood are combined
with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than
merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the
First Amendment.”47 The State has an interest in setting standards for
education, and for ensuring that children reach these standards, but the
Amish parents successfully convinced the Court that their upbringing
outside of conventional schooling was sufficient to fill the gap.48 The
parental rights coupled with the right to free exercise to carry the day for the
Amish. Thus a precedent was born, giving grounds for the argument that
hybrid rights should be more protected than singular rights.
b. Safety and Health
The parental rights doctrine, even when coupled with a religious right,
isn’t necessarily ironclad.
This was evidenced by Prince v.
Massachusetts.49 Massachusetts had a child labor law that, in part, forbade
a child from “sell[ing], expos[ing] or offer[ing] for sale any newspapers,
magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise of any
description...in any street or public place.”50 The onus for this law was put
largely on the parents and legal guardians, as it was to them that
punishment would be dealt.51 Sarah Prince, a Jehovah’s Witness, took her
young ward into the streets to pass out evangelical literature promoting the
Witnesses.52 She was confronted by a truancy officer, and later convicted

45. Id. at 210–11.
46. Interestingly, their fine was a paltry five dollars, possibly but in context might have meant much
more. See JAY WEXLER, Amish Agitation: Destination the Cheese State, in HOLY HULLABALOOS, 59,
64–84 (2009), for a humorous and personable account of Yoder, the Old Order Amish, and the
Wisconsin town of New Glarus eighty years after the fact.
47. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
48. Id. at 235 (“[The Amish] have carried the even more difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy
of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely those overall
interests that the State advances in support of its program of compulsory high school education.”).
49. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
50. Id. at 160–61 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 69 (1944)).
51. Id. at 161 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 81 (1944)).
52. Id. at 159–61.
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of violating the labor statute.53 Appealing her conviction, Ms. Prince
argued that her right to free expression, taken in conjunction with her right
to bring up the child as she saw fit, gave the state no grounds to interfere.54
The state’s interest here was not educational but protective, for “an
obvious purpose of the statute was to keep children out of [the] potentially
dangerous situation[ ]” of vending at night.55 As in Yoder, Ms. Prince
argued a hybrid rights theory, but her cause was unsuccessful.56 The Court
found that “[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”57 Despite the
slightly hyperbolic language, the point resounds that when public safety is
an issue, the state has a right to limit parental rights in order to promote “the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens.”58
The District Court of Washington took on a similar issue in Jehovah’s
Witnesses v. King County, building upon Prince’s framework vis-à-vis
medical issues.59 In King County, three religious groups brought a
challenge to a Washington state statute authorizing courts to take custody of
children if their parents refused blood transfusions.60 In particular, a boy
named Jeffrey Elam was injured in an automobile accident.61 The attending
doctors petitioned a court for an order authorizing custody of the boy to the
State and for a transfusion procedure if necessary.62 The court looked to
Prince for guidance, reiterating the statement that parents may not “make
martyrs of their children.”63 While making an important distinction by
explaining that “[i]t is true that in Prince, the [Supreme C]ourt made it clear
that it did not intend that opinion to lay the foundation for every state
intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion
which may be done in the name of their health and welfare,” the district

53. Id. at 162–63.
54. Id. at 164.
55. James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’
Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1380 (1994) [hereinafter Dwyer I].
56. Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 168.
59. Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
60. Id. at 491.
61. Id. at 497.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 504 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 170).
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court held “on the compelling authority of Prince” that the statutes were
constitutional. 64 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, approving the
district court’s conclusion.65 Taken together, these cases create a boundary
for parental rights: a parent’s choices may not “endanger seriously a child’s
physical health or safety.”66
III. WHAT’S WRONG WITH EXEMPTIONS
A. Equal Protection, Generally
Religious exemptions are built on the back of the Free Exercise Clause,
and, primarily, attacked through the Establishment Clause.67 Yet beyond
this First Amendment-based back-and-forth exists a different approach of
analyzing the exemptions. This approach, based upon the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of Equal Protection, argues that religious
exemptions unconstitutionally create two classes of children: one class
protected from neglect, and one unprotected.68
The Fourteenth Amendment holds, in part, “[n]o State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”69 The
Equal Protection Clause has become well known as the major player in
race-based decisions and the country’s gradual move towards racial
integration. For example, it was under the auspices of Equal Protection that
Brown v. Board of Education was decided, striking down segregated
schools and opening the floodgates to desegregation in all facets of life.70
Establishment Clause questions often depend upon the three prongs of
the so-called “Lemon Test,” requiring an investigation of its purpose, effect,
and entanglement,71 Equal Protection analysis usually turns on the
determination of levels of scrutiny. This determination is the method by
which a court decides which test should be applied to a challenge.72 In the

64. Id. at 504–05 (emphasis added).
65. Id., cert. denied, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
66. Dwyer I, supra note 55, at 1382.
67. See infra Part IV.
68. Rita Swan, On Statute Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to Medical Care: Can This
Discrimination be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73, 93–95 (1998).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
70. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
71. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
72. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE S AND POLICIES 539 (3d ed. 2006).
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words of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, one of the foremost scholars of the
Constitution, “[i]n constitutional litigation concerning individuals’ rights
and equal protection the outcome often very much depends on the ‘level of
scrutiny’ used. The level of scrutiny is the test that is applied to determine
if the law is constitutional.”73 There are three different types of analysis:
rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.74 The rational basis
test is the least demanding test, and “is the minimum level of scrutiny that
all laws challenged under equal protection must meet.”75 The plaintiff in
these cases bears the burden of proof, and the challenged law “will be
upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”76
Statutes are rarely overturned under this standard, for “[t]he rational basis
test is enormously deferential to the government.”77
On the other end of the spectrum, the test is most severe under a strict
scrutiny analysis.78 In order for a statute to survive strict scrutiny analysis,
“the court must regard the government’s purpose as vital, as ‘compelling.’79
Also, the law must be shown to be ‘necessary’ as a means to accomplishing
the end.”80 The burden is shifted to the state, and “laws generally are
declared unconstitutional when it is applied.”81 Interestingly, strict scrutiny
analysis can trace its origin largely to a mere footnote in an otherwiseinconsequential case, United States v. Carolene Products.82 At the time,
rational basis review was essentially the only standard for Equal Protection
analysis, and the multi-tiered approach was not yet fully realized. Justice
Stone, writing for the Court, pondered whether there existed situations
“which may call for a... more searching judicial inquiry.”83 These situations
would be those contemplating “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities... which tend[] seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”84

73. See id.
74. See id. at 540-42.
75. Id. at 672.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. Of course, a finding of unconstitutionality is not impossible under the “Rational basis” test. In
fact, some argue that religious exemptions are unable to satisfy even this low scrutiny, for “they in fact
thwart the purpose of the abuse and neglect statues because they result in certain children being deprived
of the kind of medical treatment necessary to preserve their lives.” Monopoli, supra note 11, at 349.
78. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 72, at 542.
79. Id. at 541.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 542.
82. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Since strict scrutiny analysis is typically reserved for racial minorities
(those “discrete and insular minorities”85 of Justice Stone’s phrasing), there
exists a gap where those groups who may not qualify for strict scrutiny yet
still merit increased protection may fall. For example, discrimination based
on gender is usually placed in this middle category.86 For this reason, there
exists an “intermediate” level of scrutiny to serve as a catchall.
Intermediate scrutiny is slightly more amorphous, and often is divided in
two levels itself. The higher level “requires the state to demonstrate that its
action is substantially related to a state interest that is both legitimate and
“important.’”87 The lower intermediate level “requires the state to
demonstrate that its action is substantially related to a merely legitimate
state interest.”88
The determination of whether a group merits strict scrutiny is incredibly
important, and thus far, the Supreme Court has declined to extend strict
scrutiny to groups based on age.89 This would seem to indicate that
children would not merit this heightened level of protection. Some
scholars, however, make a strong case for granting this protection; one such
scholar is Professor James Dwyer. His approach is worthy of a full
discussion, for it could serve as a strong tactic for challenging exemptions.
B. Equal Protection, Applied: Prof. Dwyer’s Approach
There is a traditional understanding in American jurisprudence that
children are, in addition to being subjects of their parents,90 also subject to
the protection of the state through the concept of “parens patriae.” From
the Latin for “parent of the country,”91 this concept “permits the state to
intervene in parental decision-making potentially harmful to a minor
child.”92 When rights are balanced in juvenile issues, therefore, the balance

85. Id.
86. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 72, at 541 (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny is used in evaluating laws involving
gender discrimination.”).
87. James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education
Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1391
(1996) [hereinafter Dwyer II] (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 1392 (citation omitted).
89. Ann Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care Decisionmaking for Children:
Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 725, 731 & n.22 (1994) (“[C]lassifications
based on gender or illegitimacy receive a heightened review that is less than strict scrutiny. The
Supreme Court has refused to extend heightened scrutiny to classifications based on wealth or age.”).
90. This is subject to some limitations; see supra Part II.B.
91. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (3d Pocket ed. 1996).
92. Massie, supra note 89, at 742.
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is between the parent’s interest and the state’s, acting as parens patriae.
Professor Dwyer has criticized this approach for leaving out the rights of
the children and violating “the moral precept that no individual is entitled to
control the life of another person, free from outside interference, no matter
how intimate the relationship between them.”93 This is especially true,
Dwyer insists, when the control goes against the person’s “temporal
interests” – ostensibly including medical decisions.94 He even criticizes
court decisions that have ruled in favor of protecting children, for while
“societal interests in the welfare of children have often been found
sufficiently compelling to trump parental free exercise claims[,]... courts
have continued to ignore or minimize the rights and interests of the children
themselves.”95
This makes logical sense, “while competent individuals may justly suffer
as a result of their own choices, no one should suffer avoidable harm
because of circumstances beyond their control, and particularly not as a
result of other people’s choices.”96 So how does this principle factor into
Equal Protection analysis? It ties directly into the level-of-scrutiny
analysis. Using the argument that the rights of the children have been
systematically ignored, Dwyer reasons that “children of religious objectors
satisfy all of the criteria for designation as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class.... [L]egislation that denies them benefits accorded other children
should be subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.”97 In particular, he defines
four factors that courts use to define a suspect class: whether the class’s
characteristics could ever be a valid state interest; whether a history of
intentional discrimination is present; the class’s ability to have political
clout; and whether the defining characteristic is immutable.98 Taking the
characteristic of a parent’s religious preference through these steps, Dwyer
concludes that strict scrutiny is an appropriate lens through which to
evaluate children’s issues. The first three he views as somewhat selfexplanatory, for “like race, the religion of one’s parents bears no inherent
relation to one’s native ability to benefit”99 from society, while children are
clearly unable to change their parents’ religion (immutability) nor have any
sway politically. Meanwhile, although children do not face “hostility

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Dwyer I, supra note 55, at 1373.
Id.
Id. at 1389.
Dwyer II, supra note 87, at 1372.
Id. at 1412.
Id. at 1396.
Id. at 1397.
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toward them on the part of the majority,” there is demonstrated “substantial
indifference” towards children in these households.100 “Legislation that
denies [some children] benefits accorded other children,” he concludes,
“should be subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.”101
Professor Zaven Saroyan offers another argument for strict scrutiny
analysis.102 He looks back to the precedents of Yoder103 and Employment
Division v. Smith104 and the development of “hybrid rights” cases. These
cases, succinctly defined, concern multiple fundamental rights.105 Saroyan
concludes that “courts must consider spiritual healing challenges as hybrid
cases,” for they concern both the parent’s religious right and the child’s
right to well-being.106 Since a case of this nature typically merits strict
scrutiny, he argues, a spiritual healing challenge should be treated no
differently.107 Under such a test, “the court will be able to reach a result in
which the child’s fundamental right to life, inarguably the most important
right in the present matter, will be protected, while still allowing a parent
the rights of free exercise and parenthood.”108
Whether through hybrid rights or straightforward suspect class
designation, the argument for strict scrutiny, and Equal Protection
generally, is a compelling one. The best way to understand the argument is
through analogy, and two strong illustrations are cases involving
illegitimate children and incompetent adults.
1. Illegitimate Children
Long ago, children of unmarried partners were viewed with disfavor and
disdain. In addition to being social outcasts, there were legal barriers in
place. One such restriction was on child support: so-called “illegitimate
children” were denied a judicially-enforceable guarantee of child support

100. Id. at 1412.
101. Id.
102. Zaven T. Saroyan, Spiritual Healing and the Free Exercise Clause: An Argument for the Use of
Strict Scrutiny, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 363 (2002).
103. See supra Part II.B.2.
104. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding the State’s right to prohibit
certain drug use, such as peyote, over religious objection).
105. Id. at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application
of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.”).
106. Saroyan, supra note 102.
107. See id. at 382–85 (analyzing why strict scrutiny applies to hybrid rights cases).
108. Id. at 385.
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that children born in wedlock were awarded.109 In 1973, the Supreme Court
held that this sort of discrimination was unconstitutional in the case of
Gomez v. Perez.110 Texas had a statute that codified old common-law
precedent: “illegitimate children... have no legal right to support from their
fathers.”111 Further, a father “may set up illegitimacy as a defense” as a
means of avoiding payment.112 As the child would be guaranteed monetary
support but for the unmarried status of its parents, a fact conceded by the
state, an equal protection challenge was taken up by the Supreme Court.113
Looking largely to precedent guaranteeing wrongful death claims despite a
finding of illegitimacy,114 the Court made the straightforward
pronouncement that “a State may not invidiously discriminate against
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children
generally.”115 As such, “once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on
behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no
constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to
a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother.”116
Similarly, children born out of wedlock were for many years denied
equal recovery rights in worker’s compensation actions.117 Instead of being
guaranteed support, these children were relegated to an “other dependents”
status and were only allowed recovery “if there are not enough surviving
dependents... [as] to exhaust the maximum allowable benefits.”118 In the
1972 case of Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, the
constitutionality of these denials was evaluated.119 The court applied a
rational basis test, yet still overturned the statute. 120 The state has a strong
interest in supporting what was termed “legitimate family relationships,”
yet the Court held that this interest was “not served by the statute.”121

109. Dwyer II, supra note 87 at 1368.
110. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
111. Id. at 537.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
115. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538.
116. Id.; see Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (finding that a two-year statute of limitations on child
support enforced against illegitimate children, yet inapplicable to children born of a marriage, is
similarly unconstitutional).
117. Monopoli, supra note 11, at 348 n.189.
118. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 168 (1972).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 172 (“[T]his Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.”).
121. Id. at 175.
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The Court went on to discuss the illegitimate children’s needs directly.
Though tacitly condoning some societal scorn on the practice of having
children outside of marriage,122 the Court strongly stated that “visiting this
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.”123 The
opinion continued:
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual [and] unjust [] way of
deterring the parent....124

Reasoning that the statute addressed no legitimate state purpose, the
Court found it unconstitutional.125 Through Weber and Gomez, the Court
upheld the notion that an Equal Protection violation exists when two classes
of children are treated differently solely because they were born into
different families.
2. Incompetent Adults
A conflict between religious beliefs and medical decisions often arises
when adults are incapacitated due to an accident or other sudden event and
do not leave behind a living will or other directive. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey grappled with this question in 1976 while handling the matter
of In re Quinlan.126 Karen Quinlan collapsed and stopped breathing for
upwards of a half hour;127 she was resuscitated but could only breathe on a
ventilator; her brain functions were impaired.128 Karen was analyzed by a
number of medical professionals, who ultimately determined that she was
“in a chronic and persistent ‘vegetative’ state, having no awareness of
anything or anyone around her and existing at a primitive reflex level.”129
After consulting their priest, Karen’s parents made the decision to
remove Karen’s ventilator and allow her to have the “natural death”

122. Id. at 175 (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of
irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.”).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 175–76.
125. Id.
126. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
127. Id. at 653–54.
128. Id. at 655.
129. Id.

2010]

TOWARDS A NEW LENS OF ANALYSIS

391

consistent with their Catholic faith.130 The hospital demurred, as the
doctors involved were unwilling to contribute to the ending of her life.131
Although the court found that the parents did have the right to remove
Karen’s ventilator,132 it did not base this finding on the Quinlan’s religious
beliefs. In fact, the court held that the argument “may be considered and
dealt with without extended discussion, given the acceptance of distinctions
so clear and simple... as to be dispositive on their face.”133 Citing a long
line of cases, the court summarily stated that “we do not recognize an
independent parental right of religious freedom to support the relief
requested.”134
The lesson of Quinlan is that parents seeking the right to act on behalf of
their children should not expect their religious beliefs to grant them
unlimited liberties to act. They may gain approval in the end, but must seek
it from other rationales in conjunction with – or instead of – their faith.
C. Equal Protection, Criticized
The argument for Equal Protection analysis is certainly not without its
critiques. One criticism comes from Professor David Steinberg. He
believes that “attacks on spiritual healing often are overbroad and
insensitive to legitimate free exercise interest and parental rights.”135 The
State should only intervene, in his estimation, when “serious physical harm
or illness” could result from inaction – and even then, the State needs to
show that medical treatment “offers a fair probability of substantially
improving the child’s health.”136 Directly addressing Dwyer’s argument, he
considers it “highly problematic and ultimately unconvincing.”137 His
criticism is mostly focused on Dwyer’s argument that children deserve
suspect-class classification. Steinberg writes that defining the class as
“children of religious objectors” and not “all spiritual healing practitioners,”
130. Id. at 659. The court evaluated extensively the amicus brief submitted by the Church and
specifically limited the decision: “the ‘Catholic view’ of religious neutrality in the circumstances of this
case is considered by the Court only in the aspect of its impact upon … Joseph Quinlan, and not as a
precedent in terms of the civil law.” Id. at 660.
131. Id. at 653.
132. The ventilator was, in fact, removed, but Karen still survived for nine more years, finally passing
away in 1985. See Robert D. McFadden, Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies; Focus of '76 Right to Die Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 12, 1985, at A1.
133. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 661.
134. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 661–62.
135. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 181.
136. Id. at 181–82.
137. Id. at 203.

392

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:227

yet proposing a change that affects the latter, is an unfair technique.138
Further, he feels that an Equal Protection challenge is unworkable, for it
distrusts the parents, the State, and even the children themselves, instead
relying upon a guardian ad litem or a judge to prosecute the act.139 In all,
Steinberg concludes, “Professor Dwyer’s Equal Protection Clause challenge
is premised on an antipathy toward spiritual healing.”140
Dr. Dwyer took some extreme approaches that could theoretically
undermine his argument. In an early article, he argued that the Constitution
guarantees no inherent parental rights whatsoever.141 Taking “a step back”
from the debates, he “ask[ed] at a fundamental level what it means to say
that individuals have rights as parents....”142 Dr. Dwyer concluded, “the
claim that parents should have child-rearing rights... is inconsistent with
principles deeply embedded in our law and morality.”143 His critique is
rooted in a theme that permeates his scholarship, the argument that “no
individual is entitled to control the life of another person, free from outside
interference, no matter how intimate the relationship between them....”144
This theme has definite merit, but his conclusion, that parents should
merely be awarded the “privilege” of raising their children, “limited in its
scope to actions and decisions not inconsistent with the child’s temporal
interests,”145 is unorthodox at best. Such a paradigm shift, no matter where
grounded, is so shocking as to possibly cast a shadow of skepticism on later
theories. Yet a greater context to the article helps belie these possible
criticisms. The article was penned in 1994, and appears to have been
written while Professor Dwyer was in pursuit of a Ph.D.146 In the years
since, his analyses have become more refined and nuanced, easing the
effect of early unorthodoxy. For example, in an article published in 2000
he again challenged spiritual treatment exemptions, but this time managed
to keep high respect for the families’ beliefs.147

138. Id. at 204–05.
139. Id. at 206.
140. Id. at 207.
141. Dwyer I, supra note 55, at 1379.
142. Id. at 1373.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1374.
146. William
&
Mary
Law
School,
Faculty
Biography:
James
Dwyer,
http://law.wm.edu/documents/directory/dwyer-648.pdf (last visited October 13, 2010).
147. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to Child Medial Neglect Laws: What
We Outsiders Should Think, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147 (2000) [hereinafter Dwyer III].
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Despite these challenges, which are not without merit, an Equal
Protection challenge to exemptions appears to be a valid approach. Even
more than mere validity, this approach is stronger than the traditional
critiques, which are couched in the Establishment Clause.
IV. TRADITIONAL CRITIQUE: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The loudest and most common criticisms of exemptions are grounded not
in Equal Protection but instead in the Establishment Clause. Often
portrayed as operating in tension with the Free Exercise Clause, the First
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.”148 This phrase has been interpreted numerous
ways over the years and is commonly understood through the image of a
“wall of separation” between church and state.149 Although the specific
meaning of this term is an endless debate, it still serves as a baseline to
which establishment questions return.
Evaluating a potential establishment violation is a difficult matter. One
enduring test, despite being “much maligned by both scholars and the
Justices themselves,”150 is the so-called “Lemon Test” established in Lemon
v. Kurtzman,151 the test has a three-step analysis: “First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statue
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”152
As for the first prong, commonly called the “secular purpose” test, “any
governmental accommodation directed exclusively to the benefit of
religious actors poses obvious problems....”153 Faith healing exemptions do
not fail this prong, for “a statute whose purpose was to alleviate significant
governmental interference with the ability of individual religious actors to
148. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
149. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) Justice Black wrote that:
The “establishment of religion” clause means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government may set up a church. Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation
between church and State.
330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164)).
150. Massie, supra note 89, at 748 (citations omitted).
151. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (forbidding public payment of teachers in private
schools).
152. Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
153. Massie, supra note 89, at 749.
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[practice their religion] would pass muster.”154 The second prong “presents
the greatest problems for accommodations aimed exclusively at religious
actors.”155 Since these exemptions “obviously provide a benefit to religious
actors that is unavailable to others,” a close look must be taken.156 Just like
every Establishment question, there is a gray area, as a line of cases
indicates that “when government policy itself has imposed a burden on
religiously motivated behavior” it may overrule establishment concerns.157
The final Lemon prong is concerned with “entanglement,” and “invalidates
policies requiring a high degree of interaction between government and
religious institutions or actors.”158 When a statute seems to single out one
particular sect or religion for benefits, such as recognizing that group with
specific and particular language, an entanglement issue may arise.159 As
such, “it would clearly be unacceptable for a court to delve into the efficacy
of spiritual healing as a means of meeting a statutory requirement of
‘adequate medical care.’”160
The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed whether or not neglect
exemptions for religious purposes violate the Establishment Clause. In
order to analyze the question outside of academia, it is necessary to look to
the state courts for precedent and guidance. In 1984, Ohio’s Court of
Common Pleas took up a challenge to an exemption brought as a result of
young Seth Miskimens’ death.161 Fascinatingly, the state itself argued for
the statute’s unconstitutionality, leaving the Christian Science church as the
only party to support the statute.162 The court evaluated the statute using
Lemon and Prince, and agreed with the state, finding unconstitutionality
under Lemon’s third prong of entanglement: “ [the statute] hopelessly
involves the state in the determination of questions which should not be the
subject of governmental inquisition....”163 The state should not, the court
confirmed, be in the business of determining what is or what is not valid
belief, for this is the very definition of entanglement under Lemon.164

154. Id.
155. Id. at 749.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 750–51; see, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(granting a religiously-based exemption to gender-based anti-discrimination statutes).
158. Id. at 752.
159. Id. at 753.
160. Id. at 754.
161. State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 931 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1984).
162. Id. at 932; see also Monopoli, supra note 11, at 346 n.170.
163. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
164. Id.
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Miskimens was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in the 1991
case of Newmark v. Williams.165 In a lengthy footnote, the court gave
approval to the Miskimens decision, opining that “[t]he reasoning applied in
Miskimens... is a firmly rooted principle of constitutional law.”166 Any
decision that would “require this Court to determine, as an initial matter,
whether a certain religion is worthy of official recognition” was properly
classified as an entanglement issue.167 Courts across the nation, then, are
beginning to classify children’s health issues that pertain to religion as
involving the Establishment Clause in at least some way. However, just
because a challenge is increasingly adopted does not make it necessarily the
optimal approach. Instead, an approach based on Equal Protection is
stronger because it does not delve into the world of judging religious beliefs
and is likely to be more acceptable to the general public.
V. WHY EQUAL PROTECTION?
A. Avoiding the Complexities of First Amendment Jurisprudence.
When handling an Establishment Clause challenge, the court is required
to toe the line of inquiring into the veracity of religious beliefs, a line it is
forbidden to cross.168 The Ohio court explained in Miskimens, “questions
such as what is a ‘recognized religious body,’ [and] what are its tenets...
run[] clearly afoul of... the ‘excessive entanglement’ test....”169 Supreme
Court precedent supports this ban on judging the truth of religion holding
that the veracity of a belief should not be submitted to a jury or other finder
of fact, even if “the religious views... seem incredible, if not preposterous,
to most people.”170 An avoidance of medicine and doctors, especially when
relating to children, is precisely the sort of belief that should not be
evaluated by the state or a jury, out of fairness to all parties involved. After
all, the parents have a right to the free expression of their religion, a right

165. Newark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1113 n.8 (Del. 1991).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1114 n.8.
168. See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 1981) (“In applying the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment, courts may not inquire into the truth, validity, or reasonableness of a claimant's
religious beliefs.”).
169. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
170. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
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that is not up to majority debate. Any challenge to a religious exemption
necessarily entails at least some such determination – or at least the
appearance of one.
An Equal Protection challenge, on the other hand, involves no such
dangerous determination. Deciding the level of scrutiny is a contentious
action, and endless debate can revolve around which level a court chooses.
Despite this potential controversy, the decision still contains none of the
major constitutional issues of religion. It avoids the proverbial “third rail”
and instead focuses on the important issue of children’s lives and not
eliminating one group’s rights at the whims of another.
B. Pragmatic Possibilities
Beyond legalistic and Constitutional concerns, public opinion does
matter. Religion is one of the most deeply entrenched issues to most
Americans – a recent survey found that 56% of citizens classified religion
as “very important” in their lives.171 Thus, any decision couched in these
matters is bound to be criticized and analyzed endlessly. Conceivably, a
decision striking down a faith healing exemption on Establishment grounds
would elicit an uproar from religious minorities of all types, even those who
do not avoid doctors. Mainstream religious would conceivably react
similarly, out of a concern for state influence in and over religion.
An appeal to fairness and even treatment on the grounds of Equal
Protection is likely to avoid many of these issues, and is likely to be more
acceptable to the general public. Certainly, some reaction is to be expected.
However, society has grappled with these arguments for decades, fighting
to deal with racial integration and its effects. If America can handle these
strong tensions, and become a stronger country as a result, then surely it can
rise to the occasion of protecting children’s rights.
C. Protecting Children’s Welfare and Personhood
If there is any universal theme in American jurisprudence, it is arguably
that those unable to help themselves are the most important and deserving
of protection. After all, how can a nation whose founding document
purports to “establish Justice [and] promote the general Welfare” stand idly

171. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY:
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 6 (2007), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2religiouslandscape-study-key-findings.pdf.
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by while children are allowed to suffer and die?172 Despite the continued
existence of exemptions that preclude any prosecution for child abuse or
neglect, district attorneys across the nation work to prosecute for deaths
under alternative statutes, such as criminal mistreatment or manslaughter.
In one notable instance, largely in response to the deaths associated with the
Followers of Christ Church,173 the Oregon legislature passed a specific
measure removing the affirmative defense of faith healing from its seconddegree manslaughter statute.174 These and other efforts demonstrate the
state’s interest in protecting children, and the persistence of religious
exemptions clearly undermines this interest. The exemptions’ political
survival is a topic and question too broad for this paper,175 but their
constitutional viability is an entirely different matter.
The argument for protecting children’s welfare by eliminating
exemptions is supported by the writings of Prof. Massie. She writes:
Given our society’s concern for the welfare of children, and the
statutory presumption that failure to provide them with certain
necessaries [sic.] constitutes abuse or neglect, it is
incomprehensible that the law would permit different definitions
of abuse or neglect to pertain to different children, depending
upon their various parents’ religious beliefs and practices. Such
an approach is a blatant violation of children’s rights to equal
protection of the laws.176
It is a reasonable and logical argument, and under this lens the continuation
of exemptions is an unjust and unconstitutional premise.

As for children’s personhood, the Supreme Court is clear:
“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights.”177 Each person has the right to decide what their personal faith
shall be, arguably the shining hallmark of the First Amendment’s religion
clauses. However, as some commentators have argued, shouldn’t a child be

172. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
173. See supra Part II.B.1.
174. See 1999 Or. Laws 954, codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (1999); see also Laura
Oppenheimer, Parents Lose Legal Defense For Using Faith Healing; Gov. John Kitzhaber Signs A
Compromise Bill That Attempts To Guarantee Children The Right To Adequate Medical Care, THE
OREGONIAN (Portland, Ore.), Aug. 17, 1999, at A1.
175. See supra note 13.
176. Massie, supra note 89, at 773.
177. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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able to live long enough to make the decision?178 If not, how can his or her
right be adequately expressed? Yes, children are treated differently than
adults, and parents have the right to direct their upbringing. Any other
conclusion undermines the possibility of a truly diverse and pluralistic
society. There must, however, be limits on how much independence a
family circle may have: after all, a husband may not use religion as an
excuse for domestic violence, so long as the victim does not publicly
object.179 At the risk of redundancy, Professor Dwyer’s words still have
strong relevance and resonance: “no individual is entitled to control the life
of another person, free from outside interference, no matter how intimate
the relationship between them.”180
VI. CONCLUSION
The crucial distinction to be drawn while analyzing parental rights is
between lifestyle and life. Parents, churches, schools, and the community
have an important role in shaping a child’s lifestyle. It is precisely these
influences that determine why one child plays baseball while another plays
the trombone, or why one goes to a synagogue while another goes to a
cathedral. These influences also determine, to a large part, whether a child
goes to college or ends up in jail. But nowhere are these social and familial
forces given the ability to determine whether a child has a life or not. This
line is crucial. It is fundamental. And it must be protected, even at the risk
of offending a parent’s religious choices.
Though they may also violate the Establishment Clause, religious
exemptions to child neglect statutes are an unconstitutional violation of
children’s right to equal protection under the law. Challenging them as
such is a potentially more effective and pragmatic endeavor than an attack
grounded in the First Amendment. A long line of cases has established that
parents may not use religion as an excuse for neglect; the state, meanwhile,
may not use the type of family a child was born into as grounds for different

178. See, e.g., Jennifer Hartsell, Mother May I…Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment for Children Based on Religious Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV. 499, 530 (1999) (“A child,
given the opportunity to attain adulthood, may choose to accept or reject the religious beliefs of his or
her parents. Either way, at least the child has a choice.”).
179. Dwyer III, supra note 147, at 166–67.
180. Dwyer I, supra note 55, at 1373.
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treatment. By removing these exemptions, children are protected while
being respected as full people under the Constitution. Children are dying
needlessly every year, and it is time to re-frame the debate, look through the
lens of Equal Protection, and do what is right.

